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he challenge of combating the 
current epidemic of disease 
mongering is daunting, and 
anyone looking for ready solutions 
should read no further. Those seeking 
a way forward ﬁ  nd themselves ranged 
against powerful economic, political, 
and professional interests. There is 
an apparently limitless amount of 
money to be made from marketing 
pharmaceutical remedies for diseases 
and even more from remedies to 
reduce risk factors for disease. An 
emphasis on the treatment of disease 
minimises political responsibility for 
those fundamental causes of disease 
that are located within the structure of 
society, and substantial and lucrative 
professional careers have been built on 
the endless pursuit of new diseases or 
risk factors for disease. 
    More fundamentally, disease 
mongering exploits the deepest 
atavistic fears of suffering and death. 
Throughout history, humanity has 
kept such fears at bay by accepting 
burdens and sacriﬁ  ces in the present 
in the hope of future salvation. 
In earlier times, the mediator was 
religion and the salvation was to come 
after death. Now, for those without 
religious belief, death has become 
more ﬁ  nal, and salvation must be 
sought before death in an ever-
expanding longevity. An adequate 
response to the false hopes raised 
by disease mongering will demand, 
from those in positions of power and 
inﬂ  uence, an ability to acknowledge, 
accommodate, and move beyond these 
profound existential fears [1]. Such 
ability is rare.
    The way forward will rely on a 
capacity to rediscover courage and 
stoicism as both private and civic 
virtues, alongside seeking a radical 
realignment of the relationship 
between economic, political, and 
professional interests. Doctors and 
biomedical scientists, in particular, 
have a responsibility not only to put 
their own house in order but to provide 
much better advice to politicians and 
to the public, both as patients and as 
citizens.
    The Challenge to Professionals
    The ﬁ  rst step has to be a genuine 
disentanglement of the medical 
profession from the pharmaceutical 
industry—there really is no such thing 
as a free lunch [2]. The pharmaceutical 
industry spends millions of dollars 
supporting the “education” of doctors 
because it is in its economic interest 
to do so (Figure 1). If prescribing 
activities and industry proﬁ  ts were 
not affected by this support, it would 
not be offered. Doctors can only 
provide appropriately independent 
and authentic advice to patients and, 
indeed, to politicians if they are seen 
to be completely independent of other 
powerful interests. Politicians genuinely 
interested in the welfare of patients and 
the health of citizens should actively 
promote such independence [4].
    Beyond this, there is a need for 
better science that has the integrity to 
demand more explicit acknowledgment 
of the limits of medical knowledge, 
less extrapolation beyond research 
ﬁ  ndings, and much more responsible 
use of statistics, so that the true extent 
of the beneﬁ  ts and harms of proposed 
treatments can be properly understood. 
    The rhetoric surrounding disease 
mongering suggests that it will promote 
health, but the effect is in fact the 
opposite. Much disease mongering 
relies on the pathologising of normal 
biological or social variation and on 
the portrayal of the presence of risk 
factors for disease as a disease state in 
itself. When pharmaceuticals are used 
to treat risk factors, the vicious circle is 
completed because “anyone who takes 
medicines is by deﬁ  nition a patient” [5]. 
    Most variables are distributed 
across a continuum, but despite this, 
the medical tradition has been to 
dichotomise the continuum into normal 
and abnormal [6]. Within a continuum, 
there can never be a clear boundary, 
so the deﬁ  nition of disease is inevitably 
both arbitrary and ﬂ  uid. It is in the 
interests of pharmaceutical companies 
to extend the range of the abnormal 
so that the market for treatments is 
proportionately enlarged. We have seen 
this process operating, for example, in 
the continual lowering of thresholds 
for treatment of blood pressure and 
lipids—the most recent guidelines from 
the European Society of Cardiology 
can be used to identify 76% of the total 
adult population of a county of Norway 
as being at “increased risk” [7].
    We need to reverse this situation so 
that instead of deﬁ  ning an arbitrary 
threshold of abnormality, governments 
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would make a judgement about the 
appropriate level of investment in 
preventive technologies for currently 
healthy populations, and set the 
thresholds for intervention accordingly. 
For example, a government might 
decide to treat the 10% of the 
population most at risk of ischaemic 
heart disease, and could then calculate 
the thresholds of blood pressure and 
cholesterol, which would identify this 
most vulnerable 10% of the population. 
Clearly, these thresholds would be 
much higher than those recommended 
today.
  Preventing  Disease  through 
Population-Based Measures
    The seeds of the current situation 
were already present 21 years ago, 
when Geoffrey Rose wrote his seminal 
paper entitled “Sick individuals and 
sick populations” [4]. In this paper, 
he showed that risk factors for health 
are almost always distributed across a 
bell curve and argued that more could 
be achieved by attempting to shift 
the whole of the bell curve than by 
targeting those at highest risk (Figure 
2). His rationale was that the large 
number of people at low risk may give 
rise to more cases of disease than the 
small number who are at high risk. 
There has been general acceptance of 
this argument, but Rose’s own warnings 
seem to have been lost. 
    Rose was careful to list the 
  disadvantages   of attempting to shift the 
whole bell curve, which included (1) a 
“worrisome” beneﬁ  t–risk ratio (there 
is only a small possibility of beneﬁ  t 
for any one individual, but everyone 
is exposed to the intervention and 
thereby to any adverse effects, such as 
medicalisation, anxiety, and side effects 
of treatments) and (2) poor motivation 
on the part of individual patients, each 
of whom had a very small chance of 
beneﬁ  t. These predicted disadvantages 
have become more and more apparent, 
so there has been a systematic attempt 
to improve motivation through the 
explicit use of fear, which in itself 
erodes and undermines health. “If 
you don’t take more exercise, improve 
your diet or take this medication, 
you actively put yourself at risk of an 
untimely death.”
    Rose was also very careful to 
distinguish between two approaches to 
shifting the bell curve. The ﬁ  rst restores 
biological normality by preventing 
exposure to hazards such as tobacco 
smoke or industrial air pollution. 
The second approach is to interpose 
some new, supposedly protective 
intervention, but this is much less 
robust because it leaves the underlying 
causes intact. The current use of 
pharmaceuticals for public health 
policy falls into this category. As more 
and more risk factors are identiﬁ  ed, 
closely followed by a pharmaceutical 
treatment for each, the ambition to 
shift the whole bell curve legitimises 
the wholesale drug treatment of 
healthy populations at vast expense 
and with huge pharmaceutical proﬁ  ts. 
There is a clear need to reiterate Rose’s 
distinction and prioritise the reduction 
of exposure to biological hazards above 
the application of pharmaceutical 
prophylaxis.
    Current trends raise the prospect of 
exponential spending on preventive 
pharmaceuticals, justiﬁ  ed by potential 
long-term beneﬁ  ts to an unidentiﬁ  able, 
but statistically signiﬁ  cant, number 
of people in the population. When 
doctors treat patients with diseases, 
progress can be assessed and the 
outcome is measurable. This means 
that if the patient responds to 
treatment, it can be continued; if 
not, the treatment can be stopped. 
When doctors treat people who are 
merely at risk of disease, the outcome 
is probabilistic, so whether disease 
is prevented or was never going to 
develop, the treatment continues 
indeﬁ  nitely [9].
    Shifting the bell curve through 
population-based interventions aimed 
at protecting health is part of a long 
and magniﬁ  cent tradition which began 
when John Snow capped the Broad 
Street pump; shifting the bell curve 
through the mass pharmaceutical 
treatment of individuals turns out to 
be something quite different. Further, 
where individualised solutions become 
prevalent, societal, population-based 
interventions tend to fall away, and the 
result is worsening health inequalities.
    The medical profession needs to 
do much more to deﬁ  ne sensible 
limits to medical intervention. There 
is a clear and urgent need for more 
research into the psychological impact 
and the wider health consequences of 
being labelled “at risk” [10]. Doctors, 
and society as a whole, need to stop 
confusing health with happiness [11]. 
This confusion is at the root of much 
of the medicalisation of normal human 
variation that we are witnessing. Male 
pattern baldness and shyness, to take 
just two examples, are not diseases 
but normal parts of the range of 
human experience. We are witnessing 
diagnostic drift in a whole range of 
conditions, from depression [12] to 
hypertension [13], with pressure for 
more and more people to be included 
within the range of abnormal and 
offered treatment. The justiﬁ  cation 
for these treatments is often based 
on short-term studies, which are 
then extrapolated over much longer 
time periods. There is insufﬁ  cient 
recognition of the fact that the less 
the need for treatment, the higher 
the number needed to treat for given 
outcomes and the higher the risk 
to patients, since the rate of adverse 
effects remains constant.
    The Challenge to Politicians
    Politicians are charged with overseeing 
the organisation of society for the 
beneﬁ  t of all. A major political 
achievement of Western societies, 
with the very notable exception 
of the United States, has been the 
provision of universal health-care 
systems available and accessible to 
all. There is now a pressing need 
for politicians to recognise the 
threat to these systems, and to the 
social solidarity that they embody, 
posed by exponential increases in 
pharmaceutical expenditure. No 
universal health-care system funded by 
taxation can pay for the pharmaceutical 
treatment of all risks to health. There 
are very difﬁ  cult decisions to be made, 
but politicians must balance the wish 
to support a vibrant and innovative 
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0030146.g001
  Figure 1.   Percentage of Doctors That Use 
Information Provided by Drug Company 
Representatives in Their Clinical Practice
   Data  derived  from  [3]. 
    (Image: Adapted from a slide presentation 
created by No Free Lunch, http://www.
nofreelunch.org/downloads/Nofreelunch%20
Presentation.ppt) 
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pharmaceutical industry—and the 
undoubted economic, employment, 
and therapeutic beneﬁ  ts that drug 
companies bring—against the 
increasing capacity of this industry to 
bankrupt universal health-care systems.
    Part of the rationale for expenditure 
on the treatment of health risks is 
that it will reduce health costs in the 
long run, but such arguments do not 
stand up to close scrutiny. The costs of 
health care are highest during the year 
before death, regardless of the age at 
which death occurs. Everyone must die 
and be cared for while dying, and no 
amount of preventive pharmaceuticals 
can reduce the cost of providing this 
crucial end-of-life care [14]. The aim 
of preventive health care should be 
the reduction of untimely deaths in 
relatively young people, but the fear 
of accusations of ageism in health care 
means that doctors are encouraged 
to go on prescribing preventive 
pharmaceuticals to people well into 
their late eighties and nineties [15]. 
    In any system of health care 
predicated on social solidarity, the 
rights of individuals to treatment have 
to be balanced against the duties of 
citizens to provide the appropriate 
level of funding. Citizens agree to pay 
tax for the care of those who are sick, 
with the understanding that they, too, 
will be cared for should they, in turn, 
become sick. It remains unclear how far 
this pact of social solidarity extends to 
paying for the treatment of risk factors 
and marginal “diseases”, where the 
beneﬁ  ts in terms of reducing suffering 
are much less clear. Publicly funded 
preventive treatment of risk factors 
for those who have already exceeded 
the average life expectancy seems 
particularly hard to justify.
    Socioeconomic deprivation has 
been described as a “fundamental 
cause” of disease, which works 
through a multiplicity of risk factors 
and pathophysiological pathways 
to produce multiple disease states 
[16]. Even if one of these pathways 
is interrupted by the application of a 
preventive technology, an association 
between a fundamental cause and 
disease will reappear in a different 
form. The closer to the individual the 
intervention is situated, the less likely 
the improvement in health status is to 
be maintained. 
    In mental health problems, we see 
this process operating when people 
are helped to cope with poor housing 
and lack of rewarding employment 
through the provision of counselling, 
rather than better social conditions. 
Population-based interventions favour 
the poor because such interventions 
are applied universally and the poor 
are the most at-risk; individually 
based interventions favour the rich 
because they are more likely to make 
use of what is offered. For this reason, 
population approaches to tackling the 
fundamental causes of socioeconomic 
deprivation must remain the most 
effective way of tackling health 
inequalities [17]. However, there is also 
a continuing role for individually based 
treatment of those at the highest risk 
of particular diseases, but this must be 
effectively targeted if inequalities are 
not to be exacerbated. 
    Age is another fundamental cause of 
disease, less remediable than poverty 
but again generating multiple risk 
factors and multiple disease outcomes. 
All clinicians are familiar with the 
processes by which treating one disease 
in a frail, older person will often mean 
that symptoms reappear through 
another pathway. Authentic health care 
for the old and frail has much more 
to do with helping to preserve their 
dignity, treating them with affection, 
and supporting their continued 
involvement in social activities, rather 
than the pursuit of ever-more elusive 
cures. Politicians have a responsibility, 
alongside doctors and many others, to 
make such care available, and this in 
itself will be an important part of the 
way forward. 
    The huge amount of money 
that can be made from preventive 
technologies has diminished the 
economic importance of treatment 
technologies, particularly for those 
illnesses that primarily affect poorer 
people in poorer countries [18]. This 
has meant a shift of attention from 
the sick to the well and from the poor 
to the rich [19]. This effect of global 
markets requires a response in the 
form of an assertion of global human 
solidarity. Health inequalities matter 
globally as well as locally. A way forward 
might be through taxation or other 
means, to make the sale of preventive 
technologies in countries with above-
average expectation of life conditional 
on the availability of treatment for 
those diseases that cause the most 
catastrophic shortening of life in poor 
countries. 
  Conclusion
    Human societies are riven by the effects 
of greed and fear. The rise of preventive 
health technologies has opened up 
a new arena of human greed, which 
responds to an enduring fear. The 
greed is for ever-greater longevity; the 
fear is that of dying. The irony and the 
tragedy is that the greed inﬂ  ates the 
fear and poisons the present in the 
name of a better, or at least a longer, 
future. Ultimately, the only way of 
combating disease mongering is to 
value the manner of our living above 
the timing of our dying.   
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0030146.g002 
  Figure 2.   Risk Factors for Health Are Almost 
Always Distributed across a Bell Curve
      Geoffrey Rose argued that more could be 
achieved by attempting to shift the whole of 
the bell curve (the “population approach” to 
prevention) than by targeting those at highest 
risk (the “high-risk” approach). 
    (Image: Adapted from a ﬁ  gure by John 
Emberson from [8]) 
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